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THEATER OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
JESSIE ALLEN1

Legal interpretation must be capable of transforming itself into
action.2
In this essay I defend international human rights tribunals
against the charge that they are not ―real‖ courts (with sovereign
force behind them) by considering the proceedings in these courts as a
kind of theatrical performance. Looking at human rights courts as
theater might at first seem to validate the view that they produce
only an illusory ―show‖ of justice. To the contrary, I will argue that
self-consciously theatrical performances are what give these courts
the potential to enact real justice. I do not mean only that the courts‘
dramatic public hearings make injustice visible and bring together a
community committed to building human rights, although those are
certainly important effects. My claim goes more directly to the issue
of enforcement. After all, no court enforces its own judgment. Nor
does enforcement happen automatically or by magic. The question
then is how enforcement comes about. I will argue that the
performance of formal judicial process in international human rights
courts enacts a version of the role-based, conventionally structured
process that all courts employ to trigger enforcement of their orders
by government officials. International courts of human rights do not
substitute spectacle for enforcement. Their success as law courts is
dependent on that spectacle. The theater of human rights courts is
what makes them real courts of law.
International courts of human rights are perennially subject
to the criticism that they are not really courts of law. For those who
see sovereign command and violent enforcement as necessary legal
attributes, the work of these courts looks questionable. Even for
those of us willing to expand our definitions of law beyond strict
positivist bounds, the meanings and effects of international human
rights courts present a puzzle. We want to understand whether – and
how – the proceedings of these courts can actually remedy rights
violations, bring violators to justice, and alter the state practices that
the courts have judged to imperil human rights.
These worries are sometimes articulated by comparing
international human rights courts to theater. With no international
1
Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. For
comments on drafts and other critical contributions of knowledge thanks are
due to Elena Baylis, Deborah Brake, David Herring, Bernard Hibbitts,
Charles Jalloh, Peter Rush, Frank Valdez, Sheila Velez-Martinez, Patricia
Williams and Lucy Winner. I am grateful to Melbourne Law School‘s
Institute for International Law and the Humanities and to Lat Crit‘s 2012
North-South Exchange, where the essay began.
2
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1617
(1986).
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army or police force behind them, are the judgments of these
tribunals just a public expression of ideas about justice? Or, worse,
are their proceedings a false show of justice that distracts our
attention from the real injustices perpetrated off-stage by the
governments whose officials appear before those tribunals? In this
essay, I argue that taking the theatrical analogy seriously can
illuminate these courts‘ potential for effecting real change.
This essay proceeds in three parts. Part I first outlines the
persistent doubts that international courts of human rights have
authentic legal power, and the critique of these tribunals as a
theatrical sham. Then, I focus on a hearing of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and confirm its self-conscious emphasis on
creating a formal presentation for an audience. Part II introduces the
idea that the Inter-American Court‘s hearings can be viewed as a
particular kind of performance aimed at a particular audience effect,
namely, generating government enforcement. To do this, I revisit
Robert Cover‘s famous essay, Violence and the Word.3 There Cover
sought to reveal the necessary link between legal interpretation and
government force that is forged through judicial process. Cover
argued that viewing a court proceeding as a ―civil event where
interpretations of fact and legal concepts are tested and refined‖ hid
the way judicial process was made to trigger government force. 4
I see the charge that human rights courts are unreal because
they lack enforcement power as the mirror image of Robert Cover‘s
charge that domestic courts create the illusion of force-free justice. As
Cover showed, in the ordinary course of justice, courts‘
interpretations are enforced when government officials are induced to
perform institutional roles that overcome their individual resistance
to committing acts of violent enforcement. In the Inter-American
Court hearing, the court‘s desire to trigger that redressive violence is
anything but hidden. In fact, the court‘s attempts to induce
government enforcement becomes a theme of the performance.
In Part III of the essay, I analyze the Inter-American Court
hearing as a performance aimed at producing the transformation
Cover described. The hearing mobilizes different techniques and
capabilities of performance to make visible the violence suffered by
victims and to overcome the resistance of government officials to
forcefully redressing that violence. Without denying the ability of
judicial theater to fake human rights, my goal in analyzing the
hearing as a performance is to see what Dwight Conquergood calls
―the efficacy of theatricality,‖ the performative potential of court
rituals to make human rights, or at least, to make human rights a bit
more real.5 My analysis looks to see how the Inter-American Court
Cover, supra note 2 passim.
Id. at 1607 note 17.
5
Dwight Conquergood, Performance Theory, Hmong Shamans, and
Cultural Politics, in CRITICAL THEORY AND PERFORMANCE 41, 51 (Janelle G.
3
4

Reinelt & Joseph R. Roach, eds., 1992) (describing Shamanic healing rituals
as ―performance as making, not faking‖, quoting VICTOR TURNER, FROM
RITUAL TO THEATRE: THE HUMAN SERIOUSNESS OF PLAY 93 (1982)). See also
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performs the characteristic business of all courts—transforming its
words into deeds of governmental force.
I.

International Human Rights Courts‘ Theatrical Justice

A. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS‘ AUTHENTICITY PROBLEM
International law today is arguably more prominent and more
vexed than ever before. The last several decades have seen a
remarkable flowering, especially in the area of human rights.6 We
have new statutes, new courts, and a greatly increased volume of
widely publicized practice in transnational human rights litigation.7
But that growth has not resolved questions about the value of
adjudicating rights claims against sovereign governments in
international tribunals.
The idea that some legal rights transcend sovereignty has a
long history. Rights based on universal, natural or divine law were
once assumed to run through Western countries‘ legal systems.8 And
the basic concept that it can be lawful to intervene to prevent a
government from mistreating its own citizens has been around since
at least the seventeenth century.9 In the twentieth century, reactions
to the horrors of World War II led to a renaissance of international
rights concepts and institutions. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was signed, the first formal international war crimes
trials took place at Nuremberg, and new international conventions
and courts developed to adjudicate human rights claims and render
judicial decisions on the validity of nations‘ use of sovereign force.10
Despite their long timeline and recent proliferation, however,
international human rights still evoke skepticism. One need not be a
committed legal positivist to see official enforcement as a crucial
feature of a legal system. 11 Indeed, in some ways, the problem of
international human rights courts‘ legal status is just as acute for a
believer in natural law. As Robin West points out, for the natural
Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: ―Open Courts,‖ ―Terror Trials,‖ and
Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 7 (2011), arguing that as 18th
century court spectators began to see themselves as critical observers and to
interpret their role as judging the fairness of those proceedings, ―‘Rites‘
turned into ‗rights‘ as rulers lost discretion to close off their courts, to fire
their judges, and to preclude all persons from rights-seeking.‖
6
See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and
Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
261 (2002).
7
For example, International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006) ; Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, 37 ILM 1002; International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.
8
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2604-10 (1997)
9
Grotius, Humanitarian intervention.
10
Koh, supra note 8, at 2614-15.
11
Thus the humor in the poster I once saw with an image of an apple
hitting someone in the head and the legend: ―Gravity – it‘s not just a good
idea, it‘s the law!‖

123

CREIGHTON INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL

124

Vol. 3

lawyer, legal interpretation entails both ―virtue and power.‖12 The
natural law critique of unjust positive law is that it is force without
reason. But reason without force is just as bad, or at least just as
legally incomplete and incapable of producing genuine justice. The
basic questions, then, are whether international human rights law is
really law at all when it appears not to be backed by coercive force,
and whether international adjudications of human rights can bring
about the kind of regulation and transformation that counts as legal
change.
From both the positivist and natural law perspectives, then,
human rights courts are problematic. For positivists, courts without
sovereign force are a fake – a dangerous pretense of legality.13 For
natural lawyers, such courts are impotent – morally good, but
powerless. 14 For the positivist the absence of violent government
coercion suggests that these courts operate instead through trickery,
putting on a false show that threatens real justice, while in the
natural law vision courts without sovereign force present a kind of
saintly ineffectuality. 15 In both views, courts without official
enforcement power have no ability to really alter behavior.16 On the
one hand, international law is seen as ineffective. In this view, when
states accept the judgments of international human rights courts,
they do so only to the extent those judgments are perceived to serve
their self-interest. So, for instance, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner
argue that governments never really submit to the authority of
international courts.17 They simply calculate that it is sometimes in
their own strategic interest to participate in international tribunals.18
On the other hand, international law is seen as harmful, because by
seeming to constrain it provides an appearance of legality that gives
states cover for pursuing their political interests. In other words, the
lack of effect becomes positively harmful by giving an appearance of
legality to lawless behavior. As Nicola Lacey points out, ―Meeting
formal criteria of legitimacy . . . by observing elaborate legal
procedures . . . can provide a crucial gateway to international
recognition and hence to all sorts of material benefits.‖19 From this
perspective, international adjudications of human rights are a tool of
national governments‘ dominance, rather than a restraint on that
power.

Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of
Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145, 160 (1985).
13
Nicola Lacey, Philosophy, Political Morality, and History: Explaining
the Enduring Resonance of the Hart-Fuller Debate, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059,
12

1084-85 (2008).
14
Id. at 1082-84.
15
Id. at 1084-85. Note how in each case, the lack of violent
enforcement leads to a classic feminized image, one half of the virgin/whore
duality.
16
See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
17
Id. at 13.
18
Id. at 225.
19
Lacey, supra note 13, at 1085.
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Besides the overall cloak of legitimacy cast by the forms of
legal process, public adjudication in international courts may give
states an opportunity to rationalize particular acts of violence.
Adjudication invites, indeed requires, opposing parties to construct
public narratives to explain and justify their claims and conduct, and
frames that conduct within a spectacle of obedience to law. In the
process, governments may be able to produce an official story that
acknowledges some causal responsibility and gains the seal of legal
approval without accepting moral or political accountability for the
events that triggered legal action in the first place. For example,
Başak Çali argues that the international rights adjudications that
arose from the destruction of Kurdish villages in Turkey ―helped to
normalize large-scale violent events.‖20 The Turkish government paid
the compensation ordered by the European Court of Human Rights,
but used the adjudication process to reframe the deaths and
disappearances that gave rise to those judgments as a kind of
unintentional harm.21
You might think that the acid test of legal power would be
compliance with international court judgments. If governments do
what international courts tell them to do, doesn‘t that mean those
courts produce a real international rule of law? Perhaps, but both
critics and supporters of international human rights adjudication
insist the issue is more complicated.
There is general agreement that national governments do
what international courts say much of the time. But the significance
of that fact is deeply disputed. Skeptics argue that what looks like
compliance is really just strategic self-interest. Just because
governments act in accordance with court orders does not mean that
they are really submitting to legal judgment. They simply may be
doing what they view as beneficial to their political power. At least
one pattern in government responses to international judgments
seems to support that view. While governments are very likely to pay
money judgments, and are sometimes willing to modify policies
prospectively, they have often refused to comply with orders to
investigate human rights violations and identify and punish
perpetrators.22 While paying compensation is certainly not painless
for governments with limited resources, and changing domestic
policies can be politically costly, both are far less dangerous to
governmental power than launching investigations that are likely to
result in those governments having to accept public blame for
atrocities.23

20
Başak Çali, The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation,
Official Acknowledgement, and Human Rights Reform: the Southeast Turkey
Cases Before the European Court of Human Rights, 1996-2006, 35 LAW &

SOC. INQUIRY 311, 313 (2010).
21

Id.

Morse H. Tan, Upholding Human Rights in the Hemisphere: Casting
Down Impunity Through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 43 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 243, 271-72 (2008).
22

23

Id.
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Even those who view international human rights
optimistically, and emphasize the overall high rate of compliance
with international law, are sensitive to the question, ―Why do nations
obey international law?‖24 Paul Berman points to the work of ―legal
consciousness scholars‖ in studying the interaction between official
norms and the way individuals ―deploy, transform, or subvert official
legal understandings and thereby ‗construct‘ law on the ground.‖ 25
These theorists are, in Harold Koh‘s words, looking for ―the
‗transmission belt,‘ whereby norms created by international society
infiltrate into domestic society.‖26
Often analyses from this perspective seem to give up on the
idea that international human rights courts can trigger sovereign
force through their own proceedings.
Instead proponents of
international rights institutions develop other theories that explain
how international norms and adjudicative processes ―permeate and
influence domestic policy.‖27 So, for example, Berman suggests that
international law ―may slowly change attitudes in large populations,
effecting shifts in ideas of appropriate state behavior.‖ 28 There is
much analysis of what institutional structures and relationships
make human rights courts effective. For instance, Laurence R. Helfer
and Anne-Marie Slaughter have suggested a range of institutional
factors that contribute to an international human rights court‘s
effectiveness. 29 These include a court‘s composition, caseload,
independent fact-finding capacity, awareness of audience, neutrality,
and demonstrated autonomy from political interests. 30 But the
performance of formal court processes is oddly absent from these
analyses. Even the ―awareness of audience‖ factor in Helfer and
Slaughter‘s study is discussed mainly in terms of the court‘s written
judgments. The question I want to consider, then, is whether human
rights tribunals‘ public performances are part of the ―transmission
belt‖ that makes human rights a legal reality and, if so, how.
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION AS THEATER

1.

The Performative Nature of Courts in General

The view that an institution or event is inauthentic or
ineffective is sometimes expressed by likening it to theater.
International courts of human rights, are no exception. 31 No doubt
24
Koh, supra note 8; Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of
International Law, 84 TEXAS L. REV. 1265 (2006); Tan, supra note 22, at 272-

76.

Berman, supra note 24, at 1283.
Koh, supra note 8, at 2651.
27
Koh, supra note 8, at 2654.
28
Berman, supra note 24, at 1266.
29
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273 (1997).
25
26

Id.
See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International
Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of
International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 46 (2007) (when
30
31

international criminal law ―distracts from prophylactic strategies or excuses
failure to take prompt action in the face of [human rights] crises, it emerges
as no more than a ‗cynical theater.‘‖); David Kennedy, The International
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sometimes the comparison is simply a metaphor for superficiality or
false pretenses, intended to communicate the basic criticism that
these courts are unable to deliver real change. In fact the simile
would hardly be worth pausing over, were it not for two facts. First,
operating as they do through public performances, all courts resemble
theaters, including the ‗real‘ domestic tribunals to which the
international human rights courts are being unfavorably compared.
And, second, at least some human rights courts seem more centrally
focused on public presentation and audience impact than most
domestic courts.
From time to time, across several centuries, observers have
noted courts‘ theatrical aspects.
Jeremy Bentham‘s eighteenthcentury critique of English common law includes the observation—
the accusation, really – that the common law courts are a form of
judicial theater.32 Jeremy Bentham mocked the English common law
courts as a ―theatre of justice.‖ 33 For Bentham, the courts‘
theatricality meant both that the performances of legal actors were
insincere and that the justice they produced was illusory. For
instance he described judges‘ expressions of sympathy for convicted
defendants as ―one of the common-places of judicial oratory – of
judicial acting, upon the forensic theatre.‖ 34 In Bentham‘s view,
courtroom theater was an elaborate drama of legal techniques that
amounted to a false show of justice, rather than providing reasonable
procedures through which citizens might vindicate their legal rights.
Other observers have a more optimistic view of the histrionic
nature of courtroom process. In the early twentieth century, the
American legal realist Thurman Arnold analyzed criminal trials as
dramatizations of cultural values and the ideal of justice. 35 Arnold
argued that the formal performed nature of trial process makes it a
powerful shaper of cultural values. For Arnold, the performative
nature of judicial process was central to courts‘ ability to enact
justice. He believed, for example, that recognizably unfair trial
process contributed to increased procedural fairness because the
public performance of an unjust court ―rouses persons who would be
left unmoved by an ordinary nonceremonial injustice.‖ 36 Bentham‘s
and Arnold‘s observations combine, then, to articulate the dual
dramatic effect I am ascribing to courtroom theater -- its ability to
both falsify and reconstruct the nature of justice outside the
courtroom.

Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101,
111 (2002).
32
Jeremy Bentham, ―Rationale of Judicial Evidence,‖ in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, vol. VI, 354(John Bowring ed.l, 1843).
33
Bentham, supra note 32.
34
Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Book III, Chapter
V, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, vol. VI, 286 (Edinburgh: William
TaitBowring, ed., 1838-1843).
35
THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
36
Id. at 142.
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To be sure, one can also find repudiations of judicial theater:
―A courtroom is not a stage; and witnesses and lawyers, and judges
and juries and parties, are not players. A trial is not a drama.‖37 So
declared Erwin Griswold, then dean of Harvard Law School. For
Griswold, apparently, any concern with expression and appearance,
that is, with audience, corrupted the true purpose of law. A trial held
―for public delectation, or even public information‖ would interfere
with ―the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth.‖ 38
Griswold made these comments in opposing television cameras in
U.S. courts. The introduction of broadcast media was sure to distort
trial proceedings, he argued, because it would have ―an inhibiting
effect on some people, and an exhilarating effect on others.‖ 39
Basically, he feared that the trial‘s participants would begin playing
to the audience.
Upon consideration, however, the courts‘ awareness of their
audience seems an important, even necessary, element of any trial.
Courts are quintessentially public operations shaped by their public
character.40 It is not as though the public is simply invited to peek
into a courtroom to see something that would be happening in exactly
the same way whether they are there or not. The action of a trial
unfolds the way it does for public viewing. Public court hearings are
not, for instance, like the work of the paleontologists at Pittsburgh‘s
museum of natural history, where white coated technicians labor in a
lab set behind a plexiglass wall. Museum visitors watch the
excavation of fossils as though their lab was one more diorama in
which life goes on as usual, oblivious of our observation. Behind the
glass the paleontologists go about their work apparently heedless of
the onlookers. Presumably they follow the same steps they would if
they were alone in the lab (at least, that is how it appears to viewers).
In contrast, lawyers, litigants, judges and other courtroom
personnel acknowledge through their courtroom behavior, that their
work has a public aspect, and that their words and actions are
directed for audience effect. True, their primary audience at any
37
Erwin Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35
Should not Be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A. J. 615, 616 (1962), quoted in Bernard

J. Hibbitts, ―De-scribing Law: Performance in the Constitution of Legality‖
2nd Annual Performance Studies Conference, Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL (March 1996). Interestingly, Dean Griswold made his antitheatrical avowal in the context of opposing the introduction of television,
radio and photography into U.S. courts. Many theater professionals, and
drama critics, would be quick to point out that recording and broadcasting
court proceedings would not necessarily make them more ―theatrical.‖
Indeed, there is a strong argument that this kind of documentation and
electronic dissemination waters down the dramatic power of live
performance.
38
39

Id.
Id.

40
Resnik, supra note 5, passim; see also Judith Resnik, Courts: In and
Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 772-73 (2008). See also
Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-577 (1980) (tracing

the development of trials as public proceedings and describing one public
communal function of trials as ―catharsis.‖ Id. at 571).
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given time may not be the general public, but rather other trial
participants, most obviously the judge and the jury. But even if no
member of the general public is present to witness the action of the
trial, its proceedings are consciously geared for public viewing, and
for preserving a publicly available record. Courtroom architecture is
designed for public participation. As Judith Resnick has pointed out,
part of our very concept of a court is its openness to the public.
Paleontologists in labs that are not on public view are surely still
doing paleontology, but it is at least highly questionable whether a
court with no public access would still qualify as a real court anymore
than a theater without an audience would still remain a real
theater.41
In performance theory terms, the theatrical nature of courts
is not only their openness to public view. It is a function of their
reliance on what Richard Schechner calls ―restored behavior,‖ that is,
acts, speech, and gestures that do not originate entirely with
individuals who do and say these things.42 This separation of at least
some aspect of the words and actions from the individuals who are
speaking and acting is arguably ―the main characteristic of
performance,‖ and what separates performance from real life.43 From
Broadway plays to religious rituals to standard exchanges between
psychoanalysts and patients, we recognize this dual form of
separation or distancing, first between actor and action, speaker and
speech, and then between the whole sequence of behavior or the event
in which numerous sequences occur and the rest of our everyday
world. And another feature of these separations, because the
sequences or ―strips‖ of behavior, are recognizably not a part of the
spontaneous, naturally occurring ongoing reality, they ―can be stored,
transmitted, manipulated, [and] transformed.‖44
Like theatrical performances, much of courtroom hearings
and trials unfolds in familiar sequences that might be actually
scripted (―hear ye, hear ye,‖ ―Raise your right hand and repeat after
me . . . ,‖ ―objection‖) or that might incorporate improvised
particulars into well known stock bits. A trial always begins with the
judge‘s speech to the jury, followed by opening statements by the
opposing attorneys, followed by the case in chief and the defense,
closing statements, the judge‘s charge to the jury, and the reading of
the verdict. Judicial theater has a recognizably standard cast of
characters – the judges, parties, defense attorney, prosecutor,
witnesses, every bit as generic as the dramatis personae of a
Broadway show‘s leading man and lady, or the personnel at the local
church or temple. It is also understood that within that standard
41
Resnik, supra note 5, at 69 (Secret military proceedings created to
establish the guilt of ―suspected terrorists‖ try to capture some of the
legitimacy of public trials, without engaging in the public access that makes
trials arguably constrain government power, by calling the institutions that
preside over these proceedings ―closed military courts.‖)
42
Richard Schechner, BETWEEN THEATER AND ANTHROPOLOGY 35-55
(1985).
43
Id. at 35.
44
Id. at 36.
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format, much of the particular content of any given trial has been
planned in advance and often rehearsed. Attorneys work with
witnesses ahead of time, for instance, and develop a planned set of
questions. Opening statements and summations, or parts of them,
are often written down and memorized.
At the same time, of course, theater is many things that law
is not supposed to be. Theater is entertaining and playful, while law
is deadly serious. Theater is designed to stir up sympathy and
passion, while legal decision makers are supposed to set feelings
aside, in order to render rational, rule-bound judgments. Theater is
defined by artifice and acting, masks and illusion. In a legal culture
that equates integrity with transparency, and defines adjudication as
a search for truth, we shrink from locating courts‘ work in the
theatrical realm where appearance and audience effect are
paramount. As Bernard Hibbitts observes, ―legal performance is a
legal embarrassment.‖ 45 Hibbitts has drawn attention to both the
performance aspects of law and the extent to which legal performance
is ―marginalized and deprecated,‖ in mainstream legal analysis and
education. Law school‘s relentless focus on analyzing written judicial
opinions, and modern litigation‘s focus on documents obscures
courtroom theater in the ―blind spot of our professional perceptions.46
Nevertheless, there are those who celebrate the theatricality
of courtroom process – and its ability to affect social attitudes because
of its dramatic techniques. In the 1930s, Thurman Arnold described
criminal trials as ―drama‖ that publically aired conflicts between
important social values.47 Unlike Jeremy Bentham, Arnold saw value
in judicial theater. He thought courtroom drama spurred public
discussion of ―all the various contradictory attitudes about crime and
criminals, since these different roles are all represented by the
various persons connected with the trial, with tremendous dramatic
effect.‖48 Half a century later, Milner Ball compared American law to
theater in a style still more laudatory than Arnold‘s vision,
contending that ―it is the theatrical character of courts that makes
them spaces of freedom, human places . . . .‖ 49 More concretely, Ball
pointed out that although courts lack a stage, curtain, and footlights,
―the design and appointment of the courtroom, enhanced by
costuming and ceremony, do create a dramatic aura.‖50 Both Arnold
and Ball stressed that in addition to producing decisions that

45
Hibbitts, supra note 37. Doubtless that sense of embarrassment
about the contradictory values of playmaking and lawmaking is one reason
we do not have more developed serious criticism of courtroom theater.
46
Note, however, that the general public does not share that blindness,
as demonstrated by the apparently endless iterations of television shows and
movies that leverage courtroom drama for popular entertainment. See
Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law: Ideology and Law in
American Popular Culture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91 (2005).
47
Thurman W. Arnold, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
48
Id. at 147.
49
Milner S. Ball, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW 57 (1981).
50
Id. at 43-44.
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regulated the parties‘ rights, courts were in the business of
manufacturing images ―played to the public at large.‖51
Most recently, Judith Resnick has written extensively on the
importance of adjudication as a public performance of justice and
rights. In her view, the ―odd etiquette entailed in public adjudication
under democratic legal regimes imposes obligations on government
and disputants to treat each other – before an observant and
oftentimes critical public—as equals.‖ 52 Thus the courtroom
performance of human dignity becomes real, at least for the duration
of the performance itself.

2.

The Drama of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Observing a video of a hearing of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights confirmed that the Inter-American Court is
institutionally focused on presenting, preserving, and making widely
available a formal performance of legal process.
The Inter-American Court was established in 1979 by the
Organization of American States to interpret and enforce the
American Convention on Human Rights.53 The court, which consists
of seven judges, sits to hear cases brought against states that have
both ratified the convention and officially submitted to the Court‘s
jurisdiction. 54 Private citizens cannot bring cases to the court.
Instead, an aggrieved individual or group must lodge a complaint
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an
institution based in Washington, D.C. The Commission investigates
and issues a recommendation to the accused state. If the Commission
finds a human rights violation, and the state found to have violated
rights fails to follow the Commission‘s recommendation, the
Commission may file a case in the Inter-American Court. After paper
briefs have been submitted, the court sets a hearing date. At the
hearing, which is open to the public, representatives of the
Commission present the case and representatives of the state
respond. Although only the Commission has standing to prosecute
the case, the court at the discretion of the court‘s President can also
hear from victims, and their representatives.
51
52
53

Ball, supra note 49, at 62; Arnold, supra note 33, at 129.
Resnik, supra note 5, at 3.
Scott Davidson, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1

(1992).
54
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Slavador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaraguia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surname, Uruguay, and Venezuela
anre signatories to the convention and have formally submitted to
jurisdiction. The United States signed the convention but never ratified the
treaty. The judges elected to six-year terms by the general assembly of the
OAS. No member state may have more than one judge serving on the Court
an any given time. If a member state is brought before the court when that
country has no judge currently on the court, the state may appoint an ad hoc
judge to join the court for that case. Currently the judges are from Peru,
Argentina, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Chile.
The Peruvian judge is the president of the court. Two of the judges are
women.

131

CREIGHTON INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL

132

Vol. 3

After the public hearing, the court deliberates in private and
eventually issues a public, written judgment. If the court finds a
violation, it will often order the state to make financial reparations to
the victims‘ families, and sometimes to investigate the circumstances
of the crimes, prosecute individuals responsible, and change
government policies identified as contributing to the violation. Low
caseloads, and low rates of judgment have been a perennial problem
for the Inter-American Court. 55 In 2008, the Inter-American Court
produced nine final judgments, compared with the 1,881 judgments of
the European Court of Human Rights.56 Even by the standards of the
shrinking caseload of the U.S. Supreme Court, this is extremely low.57
The low rates of judgment may affect the significance of court
hearings in complex ways. Because the power and legitimacy of the
court is questioned due to the low caseload, hearings of those cases
may be likewise deprecated as the work of a court with little
influence. On the other hand, in a court that issues few final
judgments, but sits publically to hear cases much of the time, those
hearings arguably take on increased cultural significance in their
own right, even if they do not lead instrumentally to more written
judgments.
The court has a well-developed website (that runs in Spanish
and English), on which judgments, court documents, calendars and
videos of all the court‘s hearings are accessible. 58 I watched the
hearing in the case of Gudiel Álvarez y otros (Diario El Militar) vs.
Guatemala via video from this website. The hearing took place on
April 23, 2012, during one of the court‘s sittings away from its home
base, in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Many of the court‘s sittings take place
―on the road‖ away from the court‘s permanent home in an upscale
neighborhood in Costa Rica‘s capitol, San Jose. When the court
travels, hearings are set up in facilities that accommodate a large
audience.
The hearing I watched showed that the court is very conscious
of its performance aspect, and that its procedures are designed to
accommodate both the live public presentation of court hearings and
documentation for future viewings on the web. The video opened with
a long shot of a raised platform, set with a dais and chairs, for the
court. 59 Three tables were set on another platform, on a slightly
Davidson, supra note 53, at 3; Alexandra Huneeus, Rejecting the
Inter-American Court, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND
POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA, 118 (Javier A. Couso et al. eds., 2010).
56
Huneeus, supra note 55, at 118.
57
The United States Supreme Court issued 75 merits judgments in
2008. SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/06/end-of-term-superstat-pack/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
58
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humans [Inter-American Court of
Human Rights] (last visited Nov. 15, 2012)
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?&CFID=487586&CFTOKEN=78136649.
59
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Inter-American Court
of Human Rights], Audiencia Pública. Caso Gudiel Álvarez y otros (Diario El
Militar) Vs. Guatemala. Partes 1, 2, 3 (April 7, 2012)
http://vimeo.com/41501741.
55
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lower level, behind which lawyers and witnesses sat facing the dais
with their backs to the live public audience, facing the judges, just as
lawyers would sit at council tables in a regular courtroom. In front of
the platform with the bench and tables, many rows of chairs were set
for a large audience. Behind the dais, a large brightly colored banner
projection announced this event as ―45 Periodo Extraordinario de
Sesiones, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, GuayaquilEcuador, 23-27 abril 2012.‖ Very bright lights hung from a grid above
the platform on which the court and advocates sat, giving it an even
more stage-like quality, and creating good lighting for the video
production. In fact the scene in the video looked in some ways more
like a stage set for a television show than a courtroom.
It was immediately apparent that a good deal of planning and
resources go into the court‘s video production. There are several
different cameras, and the tape available on the website switches
back and forth between long shots and close ups of the judges, the
advocates, witnesses and audience. The court also self-consciously
accommodates other forms of documentation. At the beginning of the
hearing, after the President of the court had called the court to
session, there was a three-minute pause for photographers and
videographers to walk around the stage and audience taking pictures.
Moreover, in a shift from other courts I have observed, public
spectators –both live in the courtroom and later watchers of the video
– were positioned as the recipients of the evidence that was being
presented. At certain points in the hearing images were projected on
screens to the side of and behind the judges.
For instance,
reproductions of the Military Journal that allegedly documents the
fate of ―disappeared‖ victims appeared on the screens facing the live
audience and completely filled the frame of many parts of the video.
In contrast, in many if not most, domestic courts, evidence is
presented to the jury or judge in ways that are obscured from the
gallery of spectators. If you are seated outside the bench and jury
area, you may have trouble hearing the testimony. Finally, at least
in most U.S. courts, videos of court proceedings are decidedly
afterthoughts. Typically, a single camera holds a fixed long shot, that
might or might not be intercut occasionally by cameras on the head
and shoulders of arguing advocates. But in the Inter-American Court
video, the camera followed the visual evidence in close up and
lingered on the images as though presenting them to the viewer for
evaluation. The cameras sometimes zoomed in on a witness, advocate
or judge who was speaking, making them the focus of the shot for
some time. This had the effect of giving the video audience a
privileged view – in some ways more advantageous than the
perspective of the live hearing audience or even the judges.
In the Inter-American Court video, the camera selects varying
points of focus. This means viewers do not have to work to pick out
the most important person or viewpoint in any given moment. It also
means that the video of the hearing bears a strong resemblance to
videos we watch for entertainment – perhaps a documentary that has
had a commercial or public television release. Sometimes, as in a
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video meant for entertainment, images are paired with spoken words
that do not simply describe or recapitulate the visuals, but combine to
create a more complex layered expression. For instance, during a
lengthy – about 25 minutes long – statement by one of the attorneys
for the victims, slides of pages of the Military Journal with victims‘
names and pictures, and black and white photos of victims and their
families appeared on the courtroom screens in a continuous sequence.
On the video, the cameras cut back and forth between a medium shot
of the lawyer who was speaking from her table, long shots of the
courtroom and close-ups of the projected photos on the screens.
The choice to spend nearly half an hour screening a series of
grainy monochromatic photos of victims while a lawyer spoke about
the state‘s failure to discover their bodies or indict their killers was
obviously aimed at affecting an audience beyond the judicial decision
makers. This is, after all, a case about people who disappeared over
30 years ago, and whose abductions and deaths were long denied by
the government. Now the victims‘ images are appearing in a
courtroom, larger than life, while their lawyer accuses the current
government of Guatemala of failing to do what is necessary to
identify and prosecute the people responsible for the disappearances
and to locate the victims‘ bodies. The presence of the victims‘ images
in the courtroom evokes both their irreversible absence in the real
world and the court‘s power to bring the victims back to memory, if
not back to life, and to make visible the crimes that were committed
against them and the need for redress.
At another point, however, the hearing confronted the court‘s
questionable power to generate the official acts needed to do more
than recover images of the victims. For instance, one judge,
Margarette McCauley of Jamaica, questioned a lawyer for the
Guatemalan government regarding the state‘s readiness and will to
investigate and prosecute those responsible the atrocities described
by the victims who testified in court.

J. McCauley: From what is being said here it is clear the prosecutor‘s
office does not have the resources to do this job – this very large task.
. . . I don‘t understand the answer you gave, that the prosecutor may
appoint a prosecutor or not. You are the state. You are representing
the state here in this court, so with all due respect I think you have to
assist us by telling us that the state can and will provide the human
resources necessary to move the investigation forward. But I
understand your answer to be opposite to that – could you explain for
me please?

State Attorney: The government can‘t decide what the judicial
branch can do or the legislative branch. . . . The executive branch has
given the Department of Justice its own budget; it‘s autonomous.
And it has the number of attorneys it has. If the attorney general
wants to assign resources, so be it. But the executive branch has
nothing to do with it. If the attorney general needs more budget, we
can help . . . .
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J. McCauley: Um. Interesting, that. Another question for you
please. . . . . in relation to the evidence of the witness that there . . .
was in existence a policy not to question members of the armed forces
even those who are suspects . . . . I understand the state to be saying
that what the witness said was incorrect and that there will be an
investigation as to why the witness said this. . . . If my understanding
is correct, I trust that no adverse result will fall on that witness for
that evidence which must be the truth, because he took an oath to tell
the truth, and there should be no adverse consequences to evidence
given in this court. But I was concerned that the state was saying,
well, we will investigate that, but I didn‘t hear any such urgency in
relation to the investigation of the tragic facts that we are here
dealing with today. So please help me understand your position.
State Attorney: . . . . It has been thirty years. And in the judicial
branch there have been proceedings, and the Attorney General‘s
office has to promote the investigation in the judicial branch. But the
executive branch – there‘s nothing for us to do . . . . We can‘t give
what we don‘t have or can‘t find . . . . There‘s no policy to hide or
destroy any information. The documents in the executive branch
have been handed over. The police documents were not destroyed.
Any other file, there‘s no policy to keep it hidden. The state is going
to participate when it has to do so.

J. McCauley: Thank you . . . .Will the state then actively pursue or
see that investigations are pursued by taking oral statements from
person who were in the armed forces at the time to give assistance as
to where these people were taken, what happened to them, whether
they were buried somewhere, to find out the spots where they were
buried? These have been done before in other cases, so will the state
do that, because if you lack written documentary evidence, you can
take oral evidence from the people who were there. So are you going
to see that that is done?

State Attorney: An attorney or interested party has the right to
request discovery within the process. If the district attorney compels
any government representative, he can appear. . . . . The government
can‘t obstruct anyone who has been forced to appear. So the state
cannot obstruct any evidence, and that is not the will of the executive
branch.
J. McCauley: If the prosecutor can summon these people and get oral
evidence, I did not hear from you whether anyone had been
summoned from the relevant time till today . . . . Could you tell me
please whether anyone has been summoned to give oral evidence in
this way in order to advance what the court needs to know?
[pause]

Young Assistant State Attorney: At the moment, no one has been
summoned other than the families of the victims. But the state
hereby states its commitment to the internal investigation. To
advance . . . rights.
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J. McCauley: Uhm hm. By that I take it it‘s your undertaking that
members of the armed forces will be called to give oral statements,
and if so, thank you.60
It seems that in this exchange, the judge has taken a
considerable risk. Confronting the state directly about its failure to
investigate and prosecute human rights violations makes the problem
visible. The exchange thus helps fulfill the court‘s role in exposing
the ongoing legacy of human rights violation and building community
support for the victims and for redress. But in the process, the court‘s
weakness is also exposed. Now if the state fails to respond to the
judge‘s direct admonition to investigate, that failure gives credit to
the view that the Inter-American Court is toothless and unable to
bring about the results it purports to demand. Then again, the
exchange between the judge and the attorney does not constitute a
formal judgment or order from the court. Formally it remains a
matter of representations, not a question of a legal injunction to be
obeyed or ignored. And even as a matter of representation the judge
leaves room for ambiguity at the end of the exchange. She first
asserts her understanding that the young assistant state attorney
has just committed the government to subpoena military witnesses.
But at the very end she reopens the possibility that no such
commitment for official state action has been made: ―if so, thank
you.‖
II.

Performing Authentic Legal Power

The exchange between Judge McCauley and the attorneys for
Guatemala points out how important it is to think practically about
the role of enforcement in legal power. In particular, as Judge
McCauley‘s questions to the state attorneys demonstrate, the
question is how a court acquires and deploys the power to get
government officials to enforce its orders and the role, if any, of the
court‘s public process in that power. The question of how courts
trigger enforcement was addressed from another perspective in
Robert Cover‘s famous 1985 essay, Violence and the Word.61
Cover criticized analyses of legal process that focused on
judicial interpretations of the law and ignored governments‘ violent
enforcement of those interpretations. 62 According to Cover, it was
―misleading‖ 63 to locate judicial authority in the logic or
persuasiveness of the judges‘ legal analysis. Instead, he argued, what
distinguishes authoritative judicial interpretation is its ability to
trigger deeds of violence to enforce the judge‘s decision.64 Ordinarily,
as Cover pointed out, judges are privileged to take for granted ―the
structure of cooperation that ensures‖ that enforcement and it
remains invisible.65 The visible lack of cooperation between the InterAmerican Court and the government officials who could enforce its
60
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Id.
Cover, supra note 2, at 1609.
Id. at 1601.
Id. at 1602.
Id. at 1607-08.
Id. at 1618.
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judgment is like a negative image of the link to enforcement that
Cover exposed in all legal interpretation. As Cover showed, all courts
must find a way to use the expressive, role-based, signifying
techniques available to them to generate violent enforcement of their
verbal judgments. The Inter-American Court‘s hearing process, then,
can be studied as that court‘s public medium of the characteristic
performative job of transforming judicial words into violent legal
enforcement.
Cover himself recognized the performative nature of the
transformation he exposed. Indeed, he characterized judges‘ ability
to trigger violence by other officials in the legal hierarchy as ―a
violent mechanism through which a substantial part of [the court‘s]
audience loses its capacity to think and act autonomously.‖66 Turning
to social psychology to flesh out the role-based process he was
analyzing, Cover offered as an example the infamous Milgram
experiment. There, participants were induced by instructions from
the scientists to administer what they believed were painful electric
shocks to individuals they believed were other experimental
subjects.67 Milgram explained the participants‘ willingness to commit
violent acts as a reaction to the scientists‘ authority within the
context of the experimental setting. 68 The subjects acted out of a
―sense of obligation to the experimentor‖ 69and ―the tendency to obey
those whom we perceive to be legitimate authorities.‖70
Note that in both the Milgram example, and in the legal
enforcement process Cover is describing, the willingness to act
violently in response to authoritative commands comes about not
through any threat of physical violence. 71 That is, the individuals
charged with carrying out the violence that enforces the experimental
protocol or the court judgment fulfill their violent task not because
they fear that they would suffer violence themselves if they refused to
enforce the orders against others. There is no legal threat for
nonperformance. True, in the legal context there is some economic
pressure – enforcers who refused to use force might well lose their
jobs. But Cover insisted that legal process mobilizes violent
enforcement at least in part through the performance of institutional
roles. Government officials must be induced to play institutional
roles as agents of government force, despite their personal
reservations. Courtroom marshals with normal human inhibitions
against causing pain will tie a defendant to a chair and force a gag
into his mouth when a judge tells them to, wardens will lead a
condemned prisoner to the electric chair, because they are responding
to a performance of institutional authority and performing their own
institutional role.
They participate in a performance in a
hierarchical institutional setting that induces them to shift from
Id. at 1615 (emphasis added).
Cover, supra note 2, at 1614-15.
68
Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. AB. & SOC.
PSYCH. 371 (1963).
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Id. at 377.
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Id. at 378.
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―autonomous behavior to agentic behavior cybernetically required to
make hierarchies work.‖72
Cover‘s insight is not merely that a psycho-social structure
exists to carry out legal enforcement. He insists that that structural
link is somehow specifically created and recreated in the performance
of legal process.
The practice of interpreting law within the
institutional context of a legal system creates the link to violent
enforcement through ―considerations of word, deed, and role.‖ 73 In
this light two things appear: (1) Whatever other effects are produced
by the Inter-American Court hearing, the hearing must be engaged to
some extent in creating this very link between the court‘s judgments
and government enforcement, and, (2) the performative nature of that
creation does not distinguish the Inter-American Court from domestic
courts that can take for granted the link to sovereign force. In other
words, the self-consciously theatrical nature of the Inter-American
Court does not make it any less legal or less real than domestic courts
that can ignore or obscure the way they go about connecting their
interpretations with enforcement. The Inter-American Court simply
must expend more resources and make more obvious its efforts to
generate the relationship that Cover exposed as central to all judicial
process. Indeed, what was a provocative idea when Cover applied it
to all authentic judicial interpretation seems self obviously to
describe the Inter-American Court hearing. As Cover put it, ―[l]egal
interpretation is (1) a practical activity, (2) designed to generate
credible threats and active deeds of violence, (3) in an effective
way.‖74
III.

Performing to Trigger Enforcement

The ―trigger‖ for enforcement that Cover describes comes
about through the response of government officials to the total effect
of the judicial process, not as a conscious individual decision in
response to legal argument. Cover explains that ―[o]n one level
judges may appear to be, and may in fact be, offering their
understanding of the normative world to their intended audience.‖75
That kind of deliberative choice is not the mechanism Cover means to
explain with his comparison to the Milgram experiments. He is
rather concerned to explain how judges induce official enforcement
through a process in which, ―a substantial part of their audience loses
its capacity to think and act autonomously.‖76 Such a result is not a
matter of logic or even conscious persuasion, but rather the total
effect of the performance of legal interpretation in the full context of
the legal-governmental-judicial role hierarchy.
In performance theory terms, the phenomenon Robert Cover
is describing is ―emergence.‖ As explained by anthropologist Edward
Schieffelin, the concept of emergence aims to capture the effects of
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performance as a whole, ―what happens by virtue of performance.‖77
The term describes ―an irreducible change in quality of experience or
situation of the participants that comes about when the performance
‗works.‘‖78 In Cover‘s view, official enforcement of judicial orders does
not come about through the autonomous decisions of the enforcing
officials or in isolation from the interpretive process. Rather,
enforcement is induced by virtue of the performance of legal
interpretation in the context of judicial hierarchy. Judges perform,
and if the performance works the judgment is enforced. Cover
criticized tendency of domestic courts and academic styles of legal
interpretation to obscure the links between judicial interpretation
and violent enforcement. As he pointed out, characterizing a trial as
―a joint or communal civil event where interpretations of facts and
legal concepts are tested and refined,‖ obscured the fact that ―control
over the defendant‘s body lies at the heart of the criminal process.‖79
In the Inter-American Court hearing, however, the need for control
over some as-yet-unidentified defendants‘ bodies is glaringly obvious.
And the court‘s efforts to induce that control becomes a central theme
of the entire proceeding.
To be sure, the Inter-American Court hearing has other
performance themes and goals besides triggering government
enforcement. On a more familiar level, the performance of the InterAmerican Court succeeds if it makes visible to the public both in
Guatemala and abroad the hidden violence suffered by the victims
and empowers a community committed to redressing and preventing
human rights violations in Guatemala. In Harold Koh‘s terms, the
Inter-American Court‘s performance would be successful if it served
as part of a process of cultural transmission ―whereby norms created
by international society infiltrate domestic society.‖80
Spectacle is a well-recognized mechanism for cultural
transmission and empowerment. Dwight Conquergood has pointed
out that the empowering effect of performance comes about through
the same ―relationship between gaze and power‖ that underwrites
Bentham‘s panopticon and that forms the basis for much of Michel
Foucault‘s work on criminal punishment.81 As Conquergood observes
of performance generally, this kind of community building and
empowering effect is not really about demonstrating anything, or
convincing skeptics. And in the Inter-American Court context, the
audience for this sort of human rights community building already
believes in the reality of the violations, the suffering of the victims
and the need for redress. ―[I]t is not so much that seeing is
believing.‖ Rather, watching the evidence unfold in the hearing
―situates the observers in a power relationship over that which is
Edward Schieffelin, On Failure and Performance: Throwing the
Medium Out of the Séance, in THE PERFORMANCE OF HEALING 59, 64 (Carol
77
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watched, inspected, surveyed.‖82 As an advocate for the victims put it
at the hearing, ―The fact that [the victims and their families] can
observe this proceeding is justice in itself because in Guatemala there
is impunity.‖
There is much more to be said about these sorts of
empowering and community generating effects of performance and
their role in the development of human rights norms and practices.
But that is not the focus of my analysis. I am focusing on the
performative effects of the Inter-American Court hearing on a specific
audience, namely Guatemalan government officials. I have argued
that the performance of the hearing contributes to inducing official
enforcement by triggering the sort of ―agentic‖ relationship Cover
described between the court and government officials.
In the
remainder of this essay, I want to consider some moments, aspects
and techniques of the hearing‘s performance that might contribute
toward making the performance effective in this second sense.
It might seem ridiculous to claim that officials of a
recalcitrant government that has avoided human rights enforcement
for 30 years would be moved by courtroom drama to give up that
resistance and mobilize state power to bring criminals to justice. But
it may not seem so absurd if we consider, as Robert Cover has shown,
that a similar process is the very mechanism through which all
judges everywhere trigger enforcement. In this light, the InterAmerican Court‘s performative methods are not essentially different
from the methods domestic courts use to transform judicial words into
enforcement. It is not that domestic courts rely any less on role
performance to accomplish that transformation. It is simply that the
political/cultural context of the Inter-American Court means that its
performance has more to overcome in order to trigger official force.
For one thing there is a much less clearly established chain of
command between the international court and the officials of a
national government. Perhaps even more significant, those officials
themselves might face actual acts of violence if they were to enforce
the court‘s judgment. In other words, what is different is not the
court‘s method of triggering enforcement by virtue of performance,
but rather the unusually high barriers the Inter-American Court‘s
performance must overcome to work, that is to successfully trigger
enforcement.
Second, to the extent that the Inter-American Court‘s
performance can overcome these obstacles to trigger enforcement, of
course that trigger does not occur because of a single hearing, but
over time. Induced enforcement would come about through multiple
courtroom performances in the total context of the international
human rights institutional structure. Some of the government
participants in the hearing I observed are probably repeat players,
who appear for the state in multiple proceedings.83 Certainly some
state officials observe multiple hearings, in person and via the video
82
83
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on the Internet. To understand how those officials might be affected,
then, we have to think of their participation in, and observation of,
multiple judicial hearing performances as part of a complex social
process that unfolds over a period of years. It is in that kind of longterm process that performance develops a social transformational
capacity as ―practices cumulatively interact and develop through
time, reconstituting agent and agency and reconfiguring context.‖ 84
Explaining how judges trigger enforcement, Robert Cover
stresses the importance of ―institutional roles.‖ 85 His basic theory,
following Milgram, is that playing a role has the potential to change
personal attitudes and overcome individual behavior. Enforcement
occurs through role play, because in the context of a legal system,
government officials who ―occupy preexisting roles, can be expected to
act, to implement, or otherwise to respond in a specified way to the
judge‘s interpretation.‖ 86
The central task of the judicial
performance, then, is to induce government officials to play
institutional roles. In the video I observed three aspects of the
hearing that might contribute to inducing that role performance.
A. FRAMING ENFORCEMENT AS THE RESTORATION OF LOST MOTHERS
Besides the basic human inhibition on behaving violently that
Cover stressed, government prosecutors of political crimes may face
an additional role conflict. Victims of political crimes are often cast
as social activists and revolutionaries, antagonists of the very
government order that produces the prosecutor‘s role. Thus a
performance to move officials to redress political crimes needs to
represent the victims as harmless and deserving of protection. In the
hearing I watched, the individuals whose torture, kidnapping and
murder were the subject of the proceedings were sometimes described
as political activists. But throughout the hearing these victims were
also repeatedly cast in a common alternative role as lost mothers.
The first victim-declarant to testify was a woman introduced
as Wendy Santizo Mendez. As announced by the secretary of the
court, she was there to testify about her mother‘s disappearance
when she was still a child. But one of the first questions her lawyer
asked was: Do you have children? She does – a six-year-old son. In
the lengthy examination that follows, Wendy (as she is called by her
lawyer and the judges), will be asked to describe not only her
memories of her mother and her loss of her mother but the way her
mother‘s absence has affected her own experience of motherhood – for
instance when her mother was not there to help her learn how to
breastfeed and care for her infant son.
Wendy was nine years old when her mother was kidnapped.
Early in her testimony, she is asked to describe that day:
Attorney: What is your last memory of your mother?
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Wendy: March 8, 1984 [smiling ruefully] International Day of
Women. Soldiers held me and my brother while we watched them
torture my mother. They took the nails off with a tool. . . . .We were
kidnapped with her. . . . I was raped. . . . We had electric shock to
our bodies; we had to watch them torture her more. . . . Her last
words to us were ―be strong.‖
In addition to her own horrific childhood experience of her
mother‘s torture, Wendy recounts the fate of her eleven-year-old
brother who was kidnapped along with Wendy and her mother and
who suffered a mental breakdown as a result. She describes how for
months after their kidnapping and her mother‘s disappearance, after
she and her brother returned home, he would sit outside the house
waiting, he said, for their mother to come home from shopping at the
market.
Wendy also explains how she initially believed that the
injuries from her rape would prevent her from having children.
When that turned out not to be the case, the loss of her mother and
the trauma of her attack nevertheless made it more difficult for her to
mother her son in a number of ways that she details. Of course her
mother‘s disappearance also caused her son to lose his grandmother.
As Wendy recounts her experience of kidnapping and torture
as a nine-year-old child and its later effects on her life, she appears
somewhat distanced from the events she recounts. She tears up once,
however, near the end of her testimony, when her lawyer asks, ―What
does that nine-year-old girl want to say‖?
Wendy: When I was raped I had no idea that could even be
done. That rape was used as a weapon of war. That girl was hopeful
that I could say this to this tribunal because then I was defenseless
but now I think that this court can defend me.
Note that the lawyer‘s question asks Wendy the witness both
to distance herself from and to represent the desires of ―that nine
year old girl‖ who was raped and lost her mother. When Wendy
responds, she talks about herself in both the first and the third
person. It may not be too much of a stretch to suggest that the
lawyer‘s question asks Wendy to perform the role of her own mother –
understanding and translating the feelings and desires of her child.
In Wendy‘s testimony, then, we have not just the story of one
lost mother and child.
In fact there is an almost dizzying
multiplication of lost mothers and children who have suffered those
losses. The theme of lost mothers continues with the second
declarant, Efran Garcia, even though he is elderly man whose
childless daughter was murdered. After he finishes his testimony,
one of the judges asks him whether his daughter had children. No
says the man, she was single and she died too young – she was going
to university. Ah, but if she had lived, persists the judge, do you
expect that she would have married and given you grandchildren –
she would have had children? Oh, yes, he says.
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In this way, the hearing reconstructs the characters of the
victims. Recasting the disappeared victims as mothers might help to
counteract official antipathy for prosecuting crimes against antigovernment activists. Moreover, dramaturgically, lost mothers seem
like ideal characters to trigger protective role responses in state
officials. Through the shaping of the witnesses‘ testimony, the
lawyers and judge recharacterize the enforcement action called for
from prosecuting political murders to finding and restoring lost
mothers.
B. MODELING THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SELF AND ROLE
The fact that institutionalized role behavior can overtake
individual impulses does not mean that performing a role is easy. In
fact, as Richard Schechner points out, one thing that all sorts of
performance share is a certain rigor: ―Performance behavior isn‘t free
and easy.
Performance behavior is known and/or practiced
behavior.‖ 87 Because of this, the performed role never ―wholly
‗belongs to‘ the performer.‖88 Individuals may experience profound
conflicts between their own emotions and the behavior appropriate
for the role they are expected to perform. The government attorneys
who would take on the institutional role of investigating and
prosecuting the crimes detailed in the Inter-American Court also
need to overcome personal feelings in order to carry out that role.
They might, for instance, feel skepticism about the victims‘ innocence
and fear that they would be ostracized by social peers, or even suffer
violent reprisals for exposing government complicity in the crimes. It
was therefore striking that the hearing featured a ‗scene‘ in which
another attorney – one who represented the victims – struggled with
and mastered personal feelings that threatened to undermine her
professional role.
Near the end of the hearing, one of the attorneys for the
victim-declarants gave a lengthy statement.
She talked for
approximately 25 minutes, about the state‘s failure to develop
evidence and prosecute the perpetrators of the atrocities, and the
desperate desire of the families to find the victims‘ bodies. As she
began to wrap up she paused, then said:
I want to thank the families . . .
But here she began to lose her ability to speak. She appeared to be
trying to stop herself from crying. Choking she spoke very softly
. . . I‘m not going to be able to do it . . . I can‘t . .. Sorry judges,
I just can‘t . . . .
Then there was more silence and fumbling, before the lawyer
continued, obviously struggling to get the words out.
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I have one hundred twenty nine clients. I want to thank Wendy,
Efran Garcia . . . and the ones at the foundation offices watching for
the opportunity of being able to represent them. It has been a honor
and a privilege to bring my grain of sand. I‘m sorry Mr. President . .
After a pause, she began to regain her composure and asked the court
for additional time for the president of the victims‘ foundation to
speak.
Some time later, near the close of the hearing, Justice
McCauley addressed the attorney, acknowledging and praising her
show of feeling:
I seemed to sense that you were a little bit embarrassed by your show
of emotion, and I just wanted to say to you don‘t be embarrassed.
Wear it as a badge of honor, because when you stop being affected by
these things, then you have become dehumanized. All of us, when we
stop being affected we become dehumanized. So be brave, and wear it
as a badge of honor.
You might think that the lawyer would be quick to take up the
judge‘s characterization of her show of emotion as a show of
humanity. This is after all a court of human rights. Moreover this
could have been taken as an opportunity to further dramatize the
horror of what her clients have suffered. But the attorney was not
buying it
-- at least not completely. Instead, she responded
equivocally:89
Thank you so much for those words. I do wear my emotion with a
badge of honor. In addition to being a lawyer I am a professor and I
have four students here with me. Emotion is part of who I am, but I
don‘t want that to interfere with my capability of representing my
clients adequately. I never want my emotions to interfere with my
representation of my clients.
The lawyer‘s response might be read as a warning to the
judge not to allow the hearing to lose its grounding in the culturalinstitutional practices of law. If the court were to lose the buttoned
down formality of a typical court proceeding, it might become less like
a court and more like a traveling stage show – and consequently be
less able to generate the legal institutional role behavior this attorney
was seeking. To be sure, such a show would be emotionally
compelling, and stir sympathy for the victims and perhaps anger with
the state. But without maintaining the restrictions of the classic
legal form, the performance would lose some of its potential to evoke
not just sympathy, but a feeling that the victims‘ harms could or
should be vindicated legally. Even a court of human rights cannot
afford to be too human without losing some of its legal authority.
Moreover, the lawyer‘s careful reaction to the judge could be taken as
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an indication of her focus on a specific audience, namely, government
officials who are potential prosecutors of the human rights violations
she has brought to the court. For the public at large, and perhaps for
the victims and their families, her show of sympathy might well
evoke humanity. But Guatemalan officials are likely to be skeptical of
such a show of emotion and to read it as evidence that they are not
dealing with a real legal performance but some kind of ‗bleeding
heart‘ show.
On another level, in rejecting the judge‘s absolution for her
show of personal feeling, the attorney modeled for those prosecutors
the successful dominance of the kind of ―agentic‖ role Cover described
(and the Milgram experimenters observed) over her individual
emotional responses. In both struggling for self-control, and refusing
to wholly accept the judge‘s approbation for her feelings, the lawyer
modeled a triumph of institutional role behavior. Her emotional
struggle dramatized her self-sacrificial acceptance of that role. At the
same time, the lawyer‘s emotional display reflected the power of the
victims‘ story. Like the tears of the wooden cigar store Indian, the
attorney‘s controlled outburst signaled both that the victims‘
suffering is so extreme that it elicits sympathy from a figure
ordinarily incapable of human feeling and that the feeling must not
be allowed to dissolve the rigid role requirements. Thus the hearing
enacted a struggle between personal sympathies and institutional roll
requirements. Ultimately the person who fought with her individual
feelings to carry out her institutional role emerged as a kind of hero
whose choice to maintain her role performance was further sanctified
by her refusal to fully accept the judge‘s sympathy. Such a
performance might contribute to the hearing‘s capacity to induce
―agentic‖ role performances from government prosecutors
participating in or watching the hearing.
C. THREATENING ROLE REVERSAL
Finally, there was a sense in which the entire dramatic
structure of the Inter-American Court hearing seemed designed to
push Guatemalan government officials into institutional roles as
human rights prosecutors in order to avoid being cast as human
rights violators. In the absence of concrete evidence identifying the
perpetrators of the offenses detailed by the victim-declarants, the
focus of the hearing often shifted from investigating the 30-year-old
crimes to investigating current official failure to prosecute the crimes.
As the exchange recounted in Section I between Justice
McCauley and the attorneys for the Guatemalan government, the
hearing sometimes involved direct confrontations that required state
officials to defend their actions or inaction.
The Guatemalan
government attorneys were clearly not inclined to acquiesce to the
judge‘s demands that the state become more active in its
investigation. But even if they were not persuaded by the judge‘s
direct demands, the structure of the hearing may tend to move them
toward a prosecutorial role. After all it is one thing to decline an
official prosecutorial role when the alternative is no role in the
performance. It is quite another when the choice is between playing a
prosecutor or a defendant. I am not suggesting that the Guatemalan
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attorneys had any reason to anticipate being prosecuted themselves.
But at the same time in the context of the performance, it must have
been uncomfortable to find themselves cast in the unfamiliar roll of
the accused.
IV.

Conclusion

It is relatively easy to articulate the way the performance of
justice in human rights courts may obscure injustice in the real
world. The public performance of a government submitting to
international adjudication brings the appearance of some legitimacy –
no matter what government officials continue to do – or refuse to do –
outside the courtroom. The spectacle of justice being done – of human
rights violators being brought to justice – distracts and fools us into
believing that spectacle is reality. The appearance of formal justice
substitutes for the unseen reality of injustice. We see state officials
deferring to the judgment of the court and treating human rights
victims as equals, being made to listen to complaints from victims
and relatives of victims. The victims are represented with equal
dignity to the government officials, and the officials are made to
contain any reaction and forced to listen and treat those individuals
with respect.
So we may be tricked into believing that the
appearance of the officials listening, submitting, and treating
individuals with respect is reality, when it is only appearance. The
performance distracts us from continuing injustice and violations
outside the courtroom.
It is likewise apparent that – as performance – human rights
tribunals can contribute to broader public support for human rights
norms. Videos available on the Internet bring dramatic public
hearings to the general public in the states being called before the
court, and to the world at large. The hearings feature victim
declarants and expert witnesses who recount terrible acts of violence.
Testimony and documentary evidence reveal acts of state violence
that were effectively hidden for many years, call government officials
to account, and affirm the experiences of those who suffered and their
right to redress. The court performances make a record that can be
used to support individual claims and provide a public focal point
where victims, families of victims, and political and social reformers
can come together to organize for change.
It is far less easy to conceive and describe how international
court performances may help trigger government enforcement that
gives human rights norms the force of law. I have tried to explore as
concretely as possible some of the ways judicial process in a
particular human rights tribunal may approach that institutional
goal through performance. In my view the theatrical nature of the
court‘s process is not at odds with its potential for authentic legal
power. Indeed, I have argued that it is only by virtue of a
performative process that any court achieves its status as an
authentic legal institution. But I want to emphasize that in no sense
do I mean to claim that the performance of justice in the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights is devoid of illusion, or of the power
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to deceive its audiences about the realities of injustice in the world.
Like all performance, the theater of international justice is both a
charade and a socially constitutive ritual, a trick and a potentially
transformative experience.
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